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Wilson v. Layne: Increasing the Scope of
the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States guarantees the protection of certain
enumerated individual rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.' Through the process of judicial interpretation, courts
have determined that this right includes protection of the right to personal
privacy from government intrusion.2 In the last ten years, the right of privacy
has generated increasing public concern and litigation.' This reemergence
results from the combination of several factors. First, there has been a notable
increase in the media's involvement in traditional law enforcement functions
such as "car chases, arrests, and execution of search warrants."'4 In recent
years, the "ride along" has emerged as a media news gathering technique,
where members of the media ride with officers as they perform their duties, or
even accompany law enforcement officials as they execute search and arrest
warrants on private property.' Another cause for increasing concern
surrounding the right to privacy is the proliferation of live-drama media shows
combined with new developments in news gathering technology.' In recent
years, the media has exploited the ride-along as a basis for popular television
shows that feature law enforcement officials in action, reflecting the reality
television boom that began in the 1980s.7 Numerous shows use ride-alongs and
live footage of law enforcement officers performing their duties, "including
Cops, Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, Top Cops, Rescue 911, Emergency
,Call, Juvenile Justice, Citizen's Arrest, and L.A.P.D."'  Aside from the
1. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See David E. Bond, Note, Police Liabilityfor the Media "Ride-Along," 77 B.U. L. REV. 825,
835-37 (1997) (tracing the historical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, from an interpretation based
solely on property rights to the separate protection of the right to privacy).
3. See Neville L. Johnson et al., Caught in the Act, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Apr. 1998 at 32; see also
Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, Law Enforcement Theatricals: Privacy in Peril, PEPP. U. SCH.
OF L. SYMPOSIUM MATRIALS MEDIA& PRIVACY, May 7, 1998, at 3.
4. See Rossbacher & Young, supra note 3, at 3.
5. See id.
6. See Johnson et al., supra note 3, at 33-34.
7. See Bond, supra note 2, at 825 & n.2. (quoting Benjamin Svetkey, Running Shotgun - Filming
of the Television Program "Cops," ENT. WKLY., Aug. 19, 1994, at 32).
8. See id. (citing David Tobenkin, Real Stories ofa Crowded Genre, BROADCAS-nNO & CABLE, May
22, 1995, at 16). Additionally, the public's voracious appetite for glimpses into the homes and lives of
others simply encourages shows of this nature. See id at n.6 (citing Arthur Salm, To Indulging Cultural
Vice, The Gentleman Pleads Guilty, SAN DIEO UNION TRIB., Mar. 9, 1995, at 4). These shows exist in
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continuing expansion of cable channels and shows available to viewers,
developments in technology have increased the media's ability to gather
information, sometimes even without the knowledge of the subject.9 This
causal relationship was recognized by the Supreme Court in Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. ' The Court stated that "[a]cceptance of the right
to privacy has grown with the increasing capability of the mass media and elec-
tronic devices with their capacity to destroy an individual's anonymity, intrude
upon his most intimate activities, and expose his most personal characteristics
to public gaze.""
The ultimate result of the foregoing events has been a blurring of the
distinction between legitimate news gathering and entertainment." Also, many
questions have arisen, such as the liability of police officers who allow
members of the media to accompany them, and the liability of the media for
recording and observing events in private homes without the permission of the
residents. "
Wilson v. Layne"' attempts to answer some of these questions and reconcile
a split in the circuits on the issues of law enforcement liability and qualified
immunity. 5 In Wilson, law enforcement officers allowed media personnel to
accompany them into the Wilson's home for purposes of executing arrest
warrants. 6 The media members did not in any way assist the officers in
executing the warrants, but rather took photographs and observed the events for
their own purposes.' 7 The Wilson's sued the officers "in their personal
capacities for money damages," and the officers in turn claimed the defense of
qualified immunity. 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
these issues, which had been the source of varied interpretations in the circuits
below."' The Supreme Court held that the law enforcement officers violated the
Wilson's Fourth Amendment right to privacy when they allowed media
an extremely competitive television market, and are often competing against sit-corns and other non-live
drama shows, see id at n.4 (citing Cynthia Littleton, Reality Television: Keeping the Heat On,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 20, 1996, at 24).
9. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 33. Significant new technological tools include increasingly smaller
hidden cameras and microphones enabling the media to listen to conversations from a great distance away.
See id.
10. 4Cal.3d529(1971).
Ii. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 533 (1971).
12. See Amicus Curiae Brief, at 9, Shulman v. Group W. Productions, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 850
(1996); see also Bond, supra note 2, at 825 & n.3 (citing Jane Hall, Ruling May Affect the Taping of
Searches, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992 at F1 1; Ray Surette, MEDIA, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES
AND REALmME 67 (1992); and Robin Andersen, "Reality" TVand Criminal Justice, THEHUMANIST, Sept.
i, 1994, at 8).
13. See Rossbacher, supra note 3, at 3.
14. 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
15. Id. at 1696.
16. Id. at 1695-96.
17. Id. at 1696.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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members to accompany them during the execution of the warrants.2' However,
the Court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity as the law in
this area was not "clearly established" at the time of the violation.2'
This decision has the effect of establishing precedent with regard to the
Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and setting a clear standard for lower
courts to follow in similar cases. This Note will examine the Court's decision
in Wilson and discuss its implications for future Fourth Amendment analysis.
Part II traces the historical background of the Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, Title 42 of the United States Code Section 1983, and the
defense of qualified immunity.22 Part III sets forth the facts of Wilson as
reported by the Court.23 Part IV analyzes Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion and Justice Stevens' opinion dissenting in part, and compares the
reasoning behind each opinion.' Part V considers the probable impact of the
Court's decision in Wilson on various groups, including the judiciary,
legislature, and society.' Finally, Section VI briefly concludes the Note with a
look at how this ruling will protect private citizens in the future.26
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.27
20. Id. at 1699.
21. Id. at 1695.
22. See infra Section II.
23. See infra Section III.
24. See infra Section IV.
25. See infra Section V.
26. See infra Section VI.
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment has long been the source of varied interpretations,
but its primary purpose is to protect the security and privacy of individuals from
arbitrary intrusions by the government.28 Respect for the privacy of the home is
a core element of the Fourth Amendment that can be traced through
jurisprudential history.29 For example, the Fourth Amendment is often
characterized as a furtherance of the English common law tradition "that a
man's house [is] his castle."3 The Supreme Court itself has frequently upheld
the notion that the Fourth Amendment fundamentally protects the right of a
person to enjoy the sanctity of his or her home, free from government
invasion."
1. The Early Cases: Property is Protected
Prior to the 1960s, the Court primarily interpreted the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizure as a
protection of property, rather than privacy interests.32 This principle was
clearly established by the Court in 1928 in Olmstead v. United States.33
Olmstead was a general manager of a business that imported and sold liquor
during the prohibition era.34 The information leading to the discovery of
Olmstead's business and his subsequent conviction was largely obtained
through the use of wiretaps on Olmstead's telephones.35 As a result, Olmstead
sued, claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 The Court noted that the wiretaps were
placed without any trespass; therefore, the Court declined to find a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.37 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is
not violated "unless there has been an official search and seizure of [a] person,
or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a
seizure."38 Through this decision, the Court set forth the notion that property
28. See Bond, supra note 2, at 832 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
29. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,609-11 (1999); see also United States v. United States Dist.
Court for E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (discussing the Fourth Amendment's protection of the
sanctity of the home).
30. See Tracey L. Mitchell, Smile! You're on Candid Camera: Media Presence and the Execution
of Warrants, 50 S.C. L. REV. 949,953 (1999) (quoting William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's
House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM.
& MARY Q. 371,400 (1980)).
31. See id. at 953 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) and United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
32. See Bond, supra note 2, at 833-35.
33. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
34. Id. at455-56.
35. Id. at 456-57.
36. Id. at 456-57.
37. Id. at 457, 464-67.
38. Id. at 466.
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rights should be used to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protections, rather than an independent right to privacy.39
However, the right to privacy did not go unacknowledged. Justice
Brandeis dissented in Olmstead, reasoning that "every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."' Also, four
years after Olmstead in United States v. Lefkowitz, 4 1 the Court noted the Fourth
Amendment's protection of an individual's privacy." Clearly, the idea of an
independent right to privacy has continually arisen in the context of the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, although
this right was not explicitly recognized until the 1960s. 3
2. 1960s and After: Privacy as well as Property is Protected
Starting in the 1960s, the Court moved away from the idea that property
rights outline the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protections. 44 In Warden v.
Hayden,5 the Court specifically rejected the idea that property rights are
determinative of the government's right to search and seize.46 The Court
recognized the shift from property to privacy, and stated that "the principal
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property. '47  Just two months after the decision in Warden, this Court
specifically overruled its previous holding in Olmstead v. United States48 that
property interests are controlling.49
In Katz v. United States,50 the Court found a violation of Katz's Fourth
Amendment right to privacy where the government wiretapped a public phone
booth and recorded Katz's conversations." Although the government did not
trespass onto Katz's property, a violation was found based on Katz's
expectation of privacy in a public place." The government agents in Katz
39. See William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV.
633,638-40 (1994).
40. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
42. See Bond, supra note 2, at 834 (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 258 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
43. See id. at 834-35.
44. See id. at 835; see also Heffernan, supra note 39, at 634.
45. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
46. See id. at 304.
47. See id.
48. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
49. Seeid.at466.
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. See ld. At 353
52. See id.; see also Heffernan, supra note 39, at 635.
complied with all of the procedures set forth in Olmstead, but the Court found a
violation regardless, reasoning that the foundation of the Olmstead trespass
doctrine had been discredited by subsequent decisions and was simply no
longer applicable. 3 The Court held that Katz had a legitimate privacy interest
in using the public telephone booth, and the government violated this interest
when it listened to and recorded his conversations, thereby conducting a search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.' It is evident that the Court,
through its decision in Katz, unequivocally recognized the right to privacy as a
legitimate basis for the protection of Fourth Amendment rights.5 However, the
effect of Katz was not to make the infringement of a privacy interest a
prerequisite to finding protection under the Fourth Amendment, but rather to
make privacy a separate and independent basis for claiming protection, along
with property and liberty interests. 6
In Soldal v. Cook County,57 the Court enunciated this principle of separate
but independent bases for protection under the Fourth Amendment. 8 In Soldal,
the Soldals and their motor home were forcibly removed from a mobile home
park under the supervision of law enforcement officers. 59 The court of appeals
found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, which the court held to only
protect privacy and liberty interests and exclude property interests.' The
Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning and held specifically
that "the Amendment protects property as well as privacy."'" The Court clearly
recognized separate sources for protection under the Fourth Amendment, such
as "the possibility of a search without a seizure and the further possibility of a
seizure without a search."'62
3. The Court's Test for Fourth Amendment Protection
Through historical, judicial interpretation, three key concepts have
emerged as being determinative of whether Fourth Amendment protection
exists in a particular situation: government action, the meaning of search or
seizure, and reasonableness.63
53. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
54. See id.
55. See Heffernan, supra note 39, at 642-43.
56. See id. at 645 (discussing the Court's multi-variable approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
57. 506 U.S. 56 (1992).
58. See id. at 64-65; see also Heffernan, supra note 39, at 636.
59. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 57-58.
60. See id. at 62.
61. See id.
62. See Heffernan, supra note 39, at 636.
63. See Michael N. Levy, The Price of Fame: Should Law Enforcement Officers who Permit Camera
Crews to Film the Execution of a Warrant in a Private Home Be Held Liable for Civil Damages?, 92
Nw. U. L. REv. 1153, 1164 (1998).
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a. Government action
Existence of a government action is a prerequisite to finding a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, because the Constitution acts only as a limitation on
the government's power.' 4 Government action can be defined as "conduct by a
government employee or a private party acting as an agent of the
government."65
b. Search or Seizure
The Fourth Amendment protects against both unreasonable searches and
seizures. 66 In United States v. Jacobsen,67 this Court defined a search as
occurring "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed."' In Katz v. United States, 69 Justice Harlan set out a
two-part test in his concurring opinion for determining when the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches applies.7' The test first
requires a subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the person alleging
the violation, and second, the expectation must be one that society recognizes
as reasonable.7 The Supreme Court officially accepted Justice Harlan's test
eleven years later in Smith v. Maryland.72 This test has been clarified and
discussed further in later cases. For example, in Rakas v. Illinois,73 the Court
test illustrated that a legitimate expectation of privacy must be based on
something other than simply the Fourth Amendment, such as real or personal
property law or common understandings of society.74 Finally, to determine the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, the Court uses a totality of the
circumstances test, and considers factors such as the Framer's intent behind the
64. See id. (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)).
65. See id.
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67. 466 U.S. 109 (10984).
68. See id. at 113 (1984); see also Casey Tourtillot, Note, Wilson v. Layne: The Growing
Relationship Between Law Enforcement and the Media: Should it Extend into Private Homes?, 67
UMKC L. REV. 445,447 (1998).
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
70. See id. at 360-62.
71. See id. at 361; see also Levy, supra note 63, at 1165.
72. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
73. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
74. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978); see also Levy, supra note 63, at 1165-
1166 (discussing the Court's test for purposes of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches).
Fourth Amendment, the particular location in question, and societal consensus
as to what deserves protection from government intrusion.75
The Court has defined a seizure of property as occurring "when there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that
property."'76 A seizure of a person occurs when "by means of physical force or a
show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."77 Similar to the
tests used with searches, the Court determines if a seizure of person or property
has occurred by looking at the totality of the circumstances and how a
reasonable person would act in the situation.78
c. Reasonableness
The last element of the Court's test is reasonableness. That is to say, the
Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.79
Usually, a warrant is required before a law enforcement officer can search a
citizen's home, ° but even with a valid warrant, the search or seizure must still
be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."'" In determining reasonableness, the Court uses
a case-by-case balancing approach,82 balancing the nature and scope of the
intrusion against the government's justifications for the intrusion." The Court
has, however, provided a few clear rules regarding reasonableness.
Specifically, the Court has held that any actions taken by the police pursuant to
a validly issued warrant must be related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion; any actions unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion
will constitute an invasion of privacy.' Additionally, the Supreme Court has
provided a bright line rule that, in the absence of a warrant or an exception to
the warrant requirement, a search is per se unreasonable. 5
It is also important to note that 18 U.S.C. § 3105 is a federal statute
placing additional limitations on the use of warrants. 6 The section states that a
75. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
76. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113(1984).
77. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
78. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1167.
79. See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV; see also Levy, supra note 63, at 1167 (discussing the Court's test for
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment).
80. See Tourtillot, supra note 68, at 447; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 n.55
(1980) (noting the existence of exigent circumstances as an exception to the warrant requirement, thereby
authorizing law enforcement officials to execute an arrest without a warrant).
81. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); see also Levy, supra note 63, at 1168 (discussing
the Court's reasonableness requirement).
82. See Bond, supra note 2, at 838 (discussing benefits and drawbacks to the Court's balancing
approach for determining reasonableness).
83. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1168 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
84. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,325 (1987).
85. See Tourtillot, supra note 68, at 448.
86. See id.
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search warrant can be served "by any of the officers mentioned in its direction
or by an officer authorized by law to serve such [a] warrant, but by no other
person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and
acting in its execution."87 Courts have interpreted this section to mean that a
person can only accompany an agent during the execution of a warrant if he is
assisting the agent in his duties.' However, compliance or noncompliance with
this statute does not alone determine whether or not a search is reasonable for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it is merely one factor to consider when
assessing reasonableness.8 9
Taken as a whole, the Court's three part test for determining the
boundaries of Fourth Amendment protection attempts to balance the interest of
society in preserving and promoting law enforcement against the privacy
interest of individual citizens.'
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Qualified Immunity
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
[elvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... 9'
In layman's terms, this section allows a person to seek monetary damages
when a state government official or person acting under color of state law has
violated his or her constitutional rights.92 The case Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics93 also provides for the right to
obtain money damages for a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal
government officials. 9 However, it is important to note that even if a violation
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1995).
88. See Tourtillot, supra note 68, at 448.
89. See id. (noting that a violation of § 3105 does not necessarily constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and if it did, most media ride alongs would be per se unreasonable).
90. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1168.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
92. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1169-70; see also Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1699 (1999).
93. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
94. See id. at 395-97.
of constitutional rights is proven, the defendant(s) may still not be liable for
monetary damages if the defense of immunity is available.95
The Court has traditionally recognized immunity defenses of two types:
absolute immunity, and qualified immunity.96 Certain government officials are
entitled to absolute immunity from civil suits due to their positions and the
decisions they make on a daily basis in their official capacities.97 For example,
legislators in their legislative functions, judges in their judicial functions,
prosecutors, executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and the
President of the United States are entitled to absolute immunity from civil
suits."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald' was the first case to find that the defense of quali-
fied immunity may be available to ordinary government employees, and set
forth the standard for when a government official is entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity."° The Court in Harlow stated that "government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."" '  The interest in allowing government officials to freely use their
discretion in performing their official duties, without being influenced by the
threat of civil suits explains the rationale for allowing the defense of qualified
immunity. 2 Additionally, it is important that citizens are not deterred from
entering public service because of concerns over liability in civil suits.° 3
In analyzing a claim of qualified immunity, the Court has previously
indicated that it is proper to first determine if there has been an actual
deprivation of a constitutional right, and then proceed to determine if the right
was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation." The Court has
reasoned that this is the optimal approach because it provides clear standards
for official conduct in future cases, rather than fostering uncertainty in the area
of constitutional law."°5
Once the court has made a determination on the issue of constitutionality,
the next step in qualified immunity analysis is to determine if the constitutional
95. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1170; see also Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696-97 (stating that analysis
regarding the issue of qualified immunity is the same for a suit under either Bivens or § 1983; both require
plaintiffs to prove the deprivation of an established constitutional right).
96. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
97. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1170 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807) (internal citations omitted).
98. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
99. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
100. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1171 (discussing the facts of Harlow and the Court's announcement
of a standard for when the defense of qualified immunity may be claimed).
101. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
102. See Tourtillot, supra note 68, at 449.
103. See id.
104. See Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999).
105. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,840 n.5 (1998) (discussing the drawbacks of
leaving the issue of constitutionality undetermined and ruling solely on the issue of qualified immunity).
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right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation."0
In Anderson v. Creighton,"°7 the Court expanded the concept of a "clearly
established" right, stating that "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right."' 8 However, the Court noted that just because a particular action
has not specifically been held unlawful does not mean that it has not been
"clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity."9 Instead, in order to
be "clearly established," the unlawfulness of a particular action must be
apparent "in light of pre-existing law.""'  Notwithstanding the preceding
standards, if an official can show extraordinary circumstances and that he
neither knew nor should have known of the applicable laws, he or she is still
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.111
The level of generality or specificity at which the right in question is
defined plays a very important role in qualified immunity analysis. If the court
defines a right very broadly-such as the right to be free from Constitutional
violations-"[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity.
• . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of
extremely abstract rights."". E  In such a case, any action violating the
Constitution would be considered a violation of a clearly established right,
regardless of whether or not it was clear that the particular action in question
constituted a violation.' However, if rights are defined too narrowly or fact-
specifically, then they will never be considered clearly established, "' and
qualified immunity will become a "license for lawless conduct."' ' Therefore, if
the defense of qualified immunity is to serve its intended purpose, courts must
not define rights too abstractly or too narrowly, but instead must attempt to
strike an appropriate balance.
C. The Federal Appellate Decisions
Four federal appellate courts have considered whether the Fourth
Amendment is violated when law enforcement officials allow the media to
106. See Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1295.
107. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
108. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,640 (1987) (discussing the "clearly established" standard
and its application).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
112. Tourtillott, supra note 68, at 449 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 693.
113. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1172.
114. See Tourtillott, supra note 68, at 449.
115. Levy, supra note 63, at 1172.
accompany them on the execution of warrants and document the activities, and
if so, whether the defense of qualified immunity is available to the officials." 6
Two circuits found a violation of the Fourth Amendment and refused to allow
the law enforcement officers to assert the defense of qualified immunity;
however, the other two circuits did not rule on the issue of constitutionality, but
held that the officers were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity."7
First, in Ayeni v. Mottola,"8 the police were authorized by warrant to
search the Ayeni's home for evidence of credit card fraud.' The police
brought with them three members of CBS television station, who videotaped
and recorded the search for their weekly program, "Street Stories."'"2  No
portion of the footage was ever broadcasted.' 2' Next, in Berger v. Hanlon,1
22
United States Fish and Wildlife Service agents searched the Berger's
property-pursuant to a search warrant-for evidence of eagle poisoning.'23 The
agents allowed a CNN media crew to accompany them, record, and videotape
the search of Berger's property, without Berger's knowledge."'2 The recorded
footage was broadcast worldwide, despite the fact that Mr. Berger was acquitted
of all eagle-poisoning felonies charged by the government.
1 25
In both cases, the courts held that the law enforcement officials' actions
constituted violations of the Fourth Amendment, and that the officials were not
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. 26 The courts held generally that
a search of private property filmed by commercial TV crews is
unconstitutional. 27 Both courts reasoned that this principle of law was clearly
established at the time because (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3105 prohibits anyone other
than law enforcement officials and people directly assisting them from
executing warrants, and because (2) allowing the presence of the media during
a search is an excessive impairment on the right to privacy.
28
In the third case, Parker v. Boyer,'29 officers executed a search warrant of
Parker's residence as part of an investigation of a Mr. Martin who was believed
116. See generally Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 113, 120 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted in part,
525 U.S. 981 (1998), aff d, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cit. 1997), cert.
granted, 525 U.S. 981 (1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), cert. denied, subnom ; Parker v. Boyer, 93
F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
117. See id.
118. 35 F.3d at 680.
119. Id. at 683.
120. Id. at 683 n.I.
121. Id. at 684.
122. 129 F.3d at 505.
123. Id. at 507-08.
124. Id. at 508-09.
125. Id. at 507. See also Henry H. Rossbacher and Tracy W. Young, Law Enforcement Theatricals:
Privacy in Peril, in LIBEL AND NEWSGATHERING LMGATION 1998, at 45, 57-58 (PLI Pat., Copyright,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Practice Course Handbook Series No. 003, 1998).
126. Rossbacher & Young, supra note 125, at 58-59.
127. Id. at59.
128. See id. at 60-61.
129. 93 F.3d 445, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1996).
174
[Vol.28:163, 2000] Wilson v. Layne
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to possess illegal weapons and who was living with the Parkers. 30 The officers
were accompanied by KSDK media personnel who videotaped and recorded the
search of Parker's residence.' 3' Although no charges were filed against Mr.
Martin, KSDK still broadcasted the search on several news shows. 32  This
court declined to rule on the issue of whether the law enforcement officials'
actions constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but found that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions because there was
no clearly established constitutional principle on point at the time of the alleged
violation.'33 The court based its decision on the fact that, although the Ayeni
decision was on point, it was rendered after the officers' actions in question."3
The fourth and final case is Wilson v. Layne, in which the lower federal court
rendered a decision similar to Parker.3'
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
The Attorney General of the United States approved a program designed to
pair state and local police officers with United States Marshals for the
apprehension of dangerous criminals, called "Operation Gunsmoke."' 36
Dominic Wilson was identified as a target of the program because he had
violated probation on three felony charges: "robbery, theft, and assault with
intent to rob."' 37 Police computers indicated that Wilson was likely to be armed
and to resist arrest.'38 The computer also listed his place of residence as the
home of petitioners, Dominic Wilson's parents."' The Montgomery County
Circuit Court issued arrest warrants for each of Dominic Wilson's probation
violations, but the warrants did not in any way mention the presence of the
media or assistance of persons other than law enforcement officers."4°
On April 16, 1992, the "Operation Gunsmoke" team, consisting of Deputy
United States Marshals and Montgomery County Police officers, prepared to
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 447.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See generally Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
136. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606. The stated policy of "Operation Gunsmoke" explained that the
program was to concentrate on "armed individuals wanted on federal and/or state and local warrants for
serious drug and other violent felonies." Id. Additionally, the program was very effective, resulting in over
three thousand arrests in forty different metropolitan areas. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See id. The law enforcement officers were unaware that this was not in fact Dominic Wilson's
place of residence. See id.
140. Id.
execute the arrest warrants for Dominic Wilson's probation violations. 4 ' The
Deputy United States Marshals invited a Washington Post reporter and
photographer to join them in the execution of the warrants as part of the
Marshal's Service documented ride-along policy. 142
In the early hours of the morning, the "Operation Gunsmoke" team, the
photographer, and the reporter entered the home of petitioners Charles and
Geraldine Wilson, parents of Dominic Wilson.'43 Petitioners were still in bed
when they heard the team enter their home, and, upon hearing the entry,
Charles Wilson went into the living room to investigate, dressed in just a pair
of underwear." Charles Wilson became angry at the armed officers' presence
in his home, and he addressed them with harsh words and insisted that they
explain their presence in his home.'45 The officers assumed that Charles
Wilson was in fact Dominic Wilson, the person they were looking for, and
proceeded to restrain Charles Wilson on the floor."' Petitioner Geraldine
Wilson then entered the living room dressed only in her nightclothes, where
she observed her husband being subdued on the floor by the armed law
enforcement officials. 1
47
The officers performed a protective sweep, determined that Dominic
Wilson was not on the premises, and departed. 4 ' However, while the officers
were in the home, the reporter saw the exchange between Charles Wilson and
the officers, and the photographer took many pictures of the events. 49 The
reporter and photographer did not assist the law enforcement officers in any
way with the execution of the arrest warrants.150
Petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued the Deputy United States
Marshals under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,'' and the Montgomery County Police officers under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.52 Petitioners alleged that the officers' actions in allowing media
personnel to accompany them and observe and record the execution of the
arrest warrant was a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 53
141. Id. at 607.
142. Id. at 607. The Marshal's ride-along policy is included as an appendix to Justice Stevens'
dissenting opinion. Id. at 625 -26.
143. ld. at 607.
144. Id.
145. Id. The officers were dressed in street clothes rather than uniforms, adding to Charles Wilson's
confusion and anger at the officers' presence. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 607-08. The Washington Post did not publish the photographs of the incident. Id. at 608.
150. Id. at 608.
151. 403 U.S. 388 (197 1) (holding that Petitioner had a cause of action for alleged violation of Fourth
Amendment rights where Petitioner alleged federal agents entered and searched Petitioner's apartment
without a warrant or probable cause).
152. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608.
153. Id.
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Respondents, the law enforcement officials, moved for summary judgement on
the basis of the defense of qualified immunity, but the District Court denied this
motion. "
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court of Appeals heard the case on interlocutory appeal, and held that
the law enforcement officers were entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity.'55 The case was reheard en banc two times, where the Court of
Appeals, divided, again upheld the officers' defense of qualified immunity.'56
However, the Court of Appeals did not decide the issue of constitutionality-that
is to say, whether the officers' actions in bringing media personnel along for
the execution of warrants is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.'57 The court
held that, because no other court had previously held specifically that the
presence of the media during police entry into a private home was a Fourth
Amendment violation, the right in question was not "clearly established" at the
time of the violation, and therefore, the defense of qualified immunity was
appropriate.158 There were five dissenting justices, who argued that the
officers' actions did violate the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and that
the law in this area was clearly established at the time of the violation.'59
In order to reconcile the split among the Circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in this case and Berger v. Hanlon,"W which raised the same
question. 6'
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne 141 F. 3d. I11, 115 (4th Cir. 1998)). Later courts held that media
presence during police entry into private homes for the execution of warrants is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but these cases were not decided before April 16, 1992, the date of the search in the instant
case. See id; see also Section II C, supra (discussing the Ayeni and Berger cases where the courts found
a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
159. See Wilson, 526 US. at 608 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 1998)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting)).
160. 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, Hanlow v. Berger, 525 U.S. 981 (1998).
161. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion.'62 Justice Rehnquist
began the opinion by noting that a plaintiff can seek monetary damages from
government officials who have violated his or her constitutional rights under
either Bivens or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 However, even if a violation exists,
"government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted
a qualified immunity and are 'shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." ''  Chief Justice
Rehnquist then pointed out that the qualified immunity analysis is the same
under either cause of action, and that a court evaluating a claim of qualified
immunity must first decide whether there has in fact been a violation of an
actual constitutional right. 165 The Chief Justice then set forth the rationale for
first deciding the issue of constitutionality: it spares the defendant unnecessary
liability and the expense and inconvenience of defending a lengthy lawsuit.1
66
Additionally, deciding the issue first fosters clear legal standards for official
conduct, benefitting the public as well as law enforcement personnel. 67
Pursuant to the aforementioned principles, the Chief Justice next turned to
the issue of constitutionality. He began by considering historical concepts
concerning the right to privacy and the sanctity of the home. The Chief Justice
quoted "that the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well
as for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.""'  He then
looked to William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, which
discussed English law's traditional respect and heightened protection for the
sanctity and privacy of the home, and the prohibition against government
intrusion into the home.'69 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist sets forth the text
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 7 °
The Chief Justice then considered how the Supreme Court had previously
applied these historical principles to situations in which police enter a private
home pursuant to a warrant. He concluded that traditional concepts of respect
for the home mean that police cannot enter a home to make an arrest without
either a warrant or exigent circumstances.' Also, an arrest warrant based on
probable cause confers on law enforcement personnel the limited authority to
162. Id. at 605.
163. Id. at 608 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 396(1971)).
164. Id. at 609 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
165. Id.(citing Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)).
166. Id. (quoting Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).
167. Id. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840-42 n.5 (1998)).
168. Id. (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91b 195 (K.B.)).
169. Id. at 610 (quoting William Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223 (1765-
1769)).
170. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV and citing United States v. United States District Court for
E.D. Michigan, 407 U.S. 299, 313 (1972)); see also Section II A, supra (quoting the text of the Fourth
Amendment).
171. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603-04 (1980)).
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enter a private home where the suspect resides if there is a reason to believe
that the suspect is inside.
7 2
The Chief Justice observed that, although the officers in the instant case
had a valid warrant and were thereby authorized to enter the Wilson's home,
that does not necessarily mean that they were entitled to bring members of the
media as well.'73 He noted that in Horton v. California,'74 this Court held that
if the scope of a search exceeds what was authorized by the warrant or
exception to the warrant requirement, any subsequent seizure is improper and
unconstitutional.' 75 He went on to say that, although this does not require
explicit authorization for every action taken in a private home, it does mean
that any actions taken by law enforcement personnel in execution of a warrant
must be "related to the objectives of the intrusion......
The Chief Justice pointed out that the media's presence inside the Wilsons'
home was clearly not related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion
because the reporters did not in any way participate in or assist with the
execution of the warrant or the attempted apprehension of Dominic Wilson."'
However, in some cases, the presence of third parties can directly assist in the
execution of a warrant.'78 For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out
that when police have a warrant to enter a home to search for stolen property,
the Court has traditionally approved the presence of third parties in order to
identify the stolen property.'79
The Chief Justice next outlined and addressed the three arguments raised
by the law enforcement officials ("Respondents"). First, Respondents argued
that law enforcement officials should be allowed to use their discretion in
determining when the presence of media members at the execution of a warrant
would "further their law enforcement mission."'" Chief Justice Rehnquist
responded that the furtherance of law enforcement objectives in a general sense
is not the same as the furtherance of the purposes of a search, and is not enough
to justify an exception to the guaranteed protections of the Fourth
Amendment.'8
172. Id. at 610-11 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 603-04).
173. Id. at 611.
174. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
175. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)).
176. Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87
(1987)).
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
179
Respondents next argued that the presence of the media could serve the
legitimate purpose of communicating the government's efforts in preventing
crime, and promoting accurate reporting of law enforcement activities.' 82 The
Chief Justice conceded that the press does play an important role in informing
the public about law enforcement practices, because each person has a small
amount of time and little ability to personally observe the operations of the
government; therefore, people rely on the media to publicize the facts of such
activities.'83 He commented that although the First Amendment does protect
the freedom of the press from governmental constraint, media ride alongs must
be judged in terms of the Fourth Amendment's protections of the individual."
Justice Rehnquist further stated that the interest in good public relations for law
enforcement and the need for accurate reporting of law enforcement activities
are not enough to justify an intrusion into the home of a private citizen.'85
Finally, the respondents argued that the media's presence would protect the
officers' safety and guard against abuses by the law enforcement officers.8 6
The Chief Justice responded that, although police officers might be justified in
videotaping entries themselves, such a situation cannot be likened to the media
presence in the instant case." 7 He pointed out that the reporter and
photographer present in the Wilsons' home were not present in order to protect
the police, but rather to further their own purposes of securing a story, and
therefore their presence was not reasonable in this case."
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that none of the respondents' arguments
justified the presence of the media inside the Wilsons' home, and held "that it
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the
media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the
execution of the warrant."'8 9
In Part III of his opinion, the Chief Justice turned to the issue of qualified
immunity." He began with general rules and concepts, and restated the
principle that "government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are granted qualified immunity and are 'shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491-92 (1975)).
184. Id.
185. id.
186. Idat 1699.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. The Court further noted that the violation of the Fourth Amendment lies in the presence of the
media, not the police, in the home. See id. at n.2. Also, the Court declined to decide whether the
exclusionary rule applies to any evidence discovered or developed by members of the media. See id.
190. See id. at 1699.
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known.".''  He explained that this means that "whether an official protected by
qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful
action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it
was taken."'" Further, the meaning of the term "clearly established" depends
substantially on the level of abstractness or specificity at which the right in
question is said to be established.'93 While this does not mean that an action
must be specifically held unlawful in order to be clearly established, it does
mean that it must be apparent to a reasonable official that what he is doing
violates a right."9
The Chief Justice acknowledged that it could be argued that any violation
of the Fourth Amendment violates a clearly established right, since the protec-
tions of the amendment clearly apply to law enforcement officials.'95 However,
as per the Court's decision in Anderson, the right must not be defined too
generally or too narrowly."9 Justice Rehnquist set forth the appropriate inquiry
in this case as "whether a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing
members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant
was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officers
possessed." 97
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that it was not unreasonable for a law
enforcement official to have believed that bringing media personnel into a
home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of existing
law at the time of the alleged violation in this case. 9 ' He set forth three reasons
for the Court's decision. First, he felt that the constitutional question in the
instant case was by no means open and shut. 199 He noted that media coverage
of law enforcement functions serves the public interest, and that, based on
general Fourth Amendment principles, it was not obvious that the officials'
conduct in Wilson violated the Constitution.2°°
Second, the Chief Justice noted the fact that, in 1992, there were no
judicial decisions holding that media ride-alongs become unconstitutional when
191. Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
192. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,639 (1987) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819)).
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 1700.
197. Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
members of the media enter a home.2°' Prahl v. Brosamle2 °2 was the only case
on point at the time, and the court there held that such conduct on the part of
law enforcement officials was not unreasonable. 3 He then addressed the two
unpublished federal District Court decisions identified by the parties in the
instant case. Both of these cases concerned media entry into private homes, but
the courts there upheld the search on unusual "non-Fourth Amendment right to
privacy theories."20" He pointed out that cases such as these do not mean that
the law is "clearly established" regarding media entry into private homes as
part of a ride-along with law enforcement officers.2 5 Bills v. Aseltine"6 was
also referred to by the petitioners to support the proposition that the law was
clearly established.2 7 In that case, the court denied summary judgement on the
issue of whether law enforcement personnel exceeded the scope of a warrant
when they allowed a private security guard to accompany them on the search to
identify stolen property that was not described in the original warrant.2"
Although the court in Bills did allude to the rule established in the instant case,
that police may not bring third parties into a private home for purposes
unrelated to the objectives of the warrant, the Chief Justice stated that this was
not enough to render the law "clearly established."2" He concluded that
petitioners had not pointed to any controlling authority on point, nor had "they
identified a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable
officer" would have known that his actions violated the law.
210
Finally, in support of his decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to the
fact that the United States Marshals in this case were acting pursuant to a
written ride-along policy that set forth guidelines for bringing media members
into private homes. 21' This policy did not prohibit media entry into private
homes, and therefore precludes any reasonable belief that such actions would be
contrary to "clearly established" law.212
201. Id.
202. 295 N.W.2d 768 (1980).
203. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616; see also Prahl, 295 N.W.2d at 782. The court in Prahl "did not
engage in an extensive Fourth Amendment analysis," and the decision was rendered in a state intermediate
court. See Praul, 295 N.W.2d at 782.
204. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616 (referring to Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1620 (ND
Ohio Jan. 6, 1984)) and Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
1980)).
205. Id. at n.3 (citing Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 918 (1976) (noting that "it is a
widespread practice of long standing for media to accompany officers into homes") cert. denied, 431 U.S.
930 (1977)).
206. 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1997).
207. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616.
208. Id. (citing Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 1992)).
209. Id. at 616-17.
210. Id. at 617.
211. Id. Justice Stevens' dissent, in the appendix, contains the actual provisions of the United States
Marshals Service ride-along policy, which was distributed to the Marshals as a booklet. See id. at 625-28.
212. Id.at70l.
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In conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the law in this area was
not clearly established, and "the officers in this case cannot have been
'expected to predict the future course of constitutional law,"' and were thus
entitled to qualified immunity."z 3 He affirmed the judgement of the Court of
Appeals.214
B. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Although Justice Stevens concurred with the Court in their finding that the
officers' actions in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, he dissented with
regard to the issue of qualified immunity.2"5 He felt that the law in this area
was "clearly established" long before the search of the Wilson's home took
place.2"6 He pointed to several factors in support of his opinion: the clarity of
the constitutional rule, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3105, common law
decisions, and the senior law enforcement official's oral testimony."1 7 In
Section I of his opinion, Justice Stevens began by restating the rule that the
actions of law enforcement officials when executing a warrant must be
exclusively limited to the objectives of the original authorized intrusion." 8 He
stated that this represents a merging of traditional English common law respect
for the privacy of the home, and American colonists' traditional dislike for
warrants and intrusion.2"9 He agreed with the majority's enunciation of the rule
213. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,562 (1978) and citing Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 321 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,557 (1967)). One critic points out that, had the Court
not allowed the defense of qualified immunity in this case, law enforcement officials would likely deny the
media the opportunity to observe police functions in all situations, precluding the media from providing the
public with valuable information. See Eve Klindera, Note, Qualified Immunity for Cops (and other Public
Officials) with Cameras: Let Common Law Remedies Ensure Press Responsibility, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 399, 403 (1999). However, others feel that the Court erred in finding the law was not clearly
established on this issue. See Mitchell, supra note 30, at 962 (stating that the officials' conduct was
"repugnant to the clearly established rights and ideals set forth in the Fourth Amendment" and that the
officials should have known that they were acting in violation of clearly established law). Additionally,
David E. Bond, in his article, felt that the Court's grant of qualified immunity would demonstrate how little
value that the Court gives to the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. See Bond, supra note 2, at 838.
214. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
215. Id. at 618-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority in this case defined the right to narrowly; the right
in question here was the right to be secure in one's home and free from intrusion by third persons
accompanying law enforcement officials. See Tourtillot, supra note 68, at 456. This right was clearly
established before the 1992 violation in the instant case. See id.
217. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contrasts this with the
majority's support for its conclusion: the proposition that the constitutional question was not "open and
shut," three judicial opinions that were not on point, and the officers' reliance on the Marshals' Service
booklet discussing ride-along policies. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 619-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
and all of its details, but noted that all of the cases referred to by the majority in
support of the rule were decided before 1992, and that none of the cases
identified any exceptions to this rule.22° Justice Stevens then noted that, in all
of the cases he had heard concerning the Fourth Amendment, rarely did the
Court ever decide unanimously that a violation was present.22" ' He went on to
say that the fact that "the Court today speaks with a single voice on the merits
of the constitutional question is unusual and certainly lends support to the
notion that the question is indeed 'open and shut.""'2 2 More importantly, he
thought that the law enforcement officials should have known that their actions
clearly exceeded the scope of the authorized warrant, and noted that the
majority did not cite any authority supporting the idea that such actions could
have been considered reasonable.223
In Part II of his opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the mere fact that no
previous court found a violation of the Fourth Amendment when law
enforcement officials allow members of the media to accompany them into
private homes does not mean that it was reasonable for an official to believe
such actions were lawful. 24 He pointed to an example where the Court found a
constitutional violation of clearly established law where there was no previous
case directly on point.
225
Justice Stevens next discounted the idea that the absence of rulings on
point could be explained by the fact that ride-along practices were common. 6
Even if officers regularly allowed media personnel to go on ride-alongs, this
does not translate into a policy of allowing members of the media to enter
private homes absent the consent of the owners.227 He also discounted the lower
court opinions relied on by the majority, because they did not address the
Fourth Amendment directly and thus could not be relied on by the officers to
220. Id. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the respondent's position rested
solely on the proposition that the presence of the media served legitimate purposes, and the majority's
rejection of this rationale cannot be considered the establishment of a new rule of law. See id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
221. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority opinion's determination that the constitutional
question was not "open and shut" at the time of the violation in this case).
223. Id. at 620-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Just because there was not a previous case with the exact same
fact pattern holding such actions unconstitutional does not mean that preexisting law was not clearly
established. See Mitchell, supra note 30, at 961-62.
225. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997),
the Court found that a state judge violated clearly existing law when he used his position to obtain sexual
favors from a party in lawsuit, even though no court had previously held these specific actions to be
unconstitutional. Id.
226. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens distinguished the instant case from situations where
firefighters allow photographers to enter and take pictures of buildings damaged by fire. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In that situation, the photographer's conduct is proper based on a theory of implied consent,
which is not applicable to the instant case. Id. at 621-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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justify their conduct.228 The fact that some of the cases relied on by the majority
were unpublished makes reliance on them very problematic, and even if they
were persuasive, these cases relied on theories other than the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.229 As for Prahl v. Brosamle,23 ° the other case
relied upon by the majority, "it actually held that the defendants' motion to
dismiss should have been denied because the allegation supported the
conclusion that the officer committed a trespass when he allowed a third party
to enter the plaintiff's property.""23 He noted that this case, therefore, could not
possibly support the assumption that the officers in Wilson acted reasonably.
232
He thought that the most persuasive evidence of an officer's understanding
of the state of the law at the time of the search in the instant case was testimony
provided by the Sheriff of Montgomery County, who stated that "'[w]e would
never let a civilian into a home .... That's just not allowed.' 233
Finally, in Part III of his opinion, Justice Stevens discredited the majority's
recognition of the Marshals' reliance on the documented ride-along policy as
evidence of the reasonableness of the officers' actions."3 He noted that the
author of the policy was clearly not a lawyer, but an employee of the United
States Marshals Service concerned with public relations, particularly interested
in creating a good impression with Congress. 235 Additionally, the policy does
not set forth any prerequisite conditions to be met before media entry into the
home becomes proper.236  Rather, it contains rules regarding how officers
should act and speak in front of the camera, with no more.237 In sum, Justice
Stevens thought that "[t]he notion that any member of that well-trained cadre of
professionals would rely on such a document for guidance in the performance
of dangerous law enforcement assignments is too far-fetched to merit serious
consideration."238
In conclusion, Justice Stevens did not think the officers in this case were
entitled to qualified immunity, because the law in this area was clearly estab-
228. Id. at 622-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, cases decided after the cases relied on by the
majority went further in establishing the rule that the officers' conduct was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. 295 N.W. 2d. 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
231. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 623-24.(Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 624 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 625 (setting forth the documented ride-along policy
for the United States Marshals' Service).
235. Id. at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 624-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
lished before the alleged violation occurred." 9 By granting the defense of
qualified immunity, he believed that the majority needlessly authorized a "free
violation" of the clearly established protections of the Fourth Amendment.2"
VI. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Judicial Impact
The Court's decision in Wilson v. Layne"4 has impacted several areas
of judicial analysis: the Fourth Amendment, the defense of qualified immunity,
and the liability of the media.
1. Fourth Amendment Analysis
In Wilson v. Layne, the Court created a bright line test holding that media
intrusions into the private home violate the Fourth Amendment when the
media's presence is unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement justification for
entry into the home.242 As a result, the law will be considered "clearly
established" for purposes of qualified immunity analysis in future cases.243
Lower courts will no longer have to treat media ride-alongs into private homes
as a gray area of the law, but instead have a clear constitutional rule to
follow.'
The impact is already apparent and evidenced by several lower court
decision. In McDonald v. State," the Florida Court of Appeal also read
Wilson narrowly, as only invalidating actions that are not specifically
authorized by the warrant, but upholding the validity of any previous actions
before the violation occurred.246 In McDonald, police officers had a search
warrant to search the home of Donat McDonald for evidence of possession of
marijuana.247 The officers executed the search warrant and discovered large
quantities of marijuana.2" The officers then proceeded to set up a reverse sting
operation whereby McDonald was told to act normal and proceed to sell drugs
to all who came to his house.249 The officers arrested, handcuffed and
239. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
242. See Mitchell, supra note 30, at 963.
243. Id. Cases like this will no longer turn on whether or not the officers should have known that their
conduct violated established law. See id.
244. Id.
245. 742 So.2d 830 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1999), reh'g denied, 763 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 2000).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 831.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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processed approximately twenty-three people who came to McDonald's house
to purchase drugs, over the course of six hours. ° McDonald challenged the
use of the original marijuana as evidence against him, stating that the reverse-
sting operation was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his
constitutional rights, thereby excluding any evidence obtained through the
search."' The court looked to Wilson, where the Supreme Court specifically
declined to decide whether the exclusionary rule would apply to evidence
discovered by media members who accompanied law enforcement officials into
private homes in violation of the Fourth Amendment.252 The court in
McDonald interpreted this to mean that, even if a search or seizure becomes
unlawful, evidence obtained prior to the point where the search or seizure
becomes unlawful would still be admissible.253 Therefore, the court found that,
even if the reverse sting operation exceeded the scope of the warrant, any
evidence obtained prior to the reverse sting operation would still be
admissible.5 Thus, this lower court read Wilson narrowly in terms of its effect
on the exclusionary rule.
2. Qualified Immunity Analysis
Wilson's obvious impact on qualified immunity analysis is that officers can
no longer claim the defense of qualified immunity when they are sued in their
personal capacities for violating individuals' Fourth Amendment right to
privacy by allowing media members to accompany them into private homes. 55
However, the decision in Wilson has raised some interesting issues in the lower
courts regarding the issue of qualified immunity.
First, in Bevill v. UAB Walker College,256 the District Court for the North-
ern District of Alabama read Wilson as relaxing the standard for showing that a
law is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity.257 The court in
Bevill stated that in Wilson, "the Supreme court apparently relaxed this require-
ment, indicating that a plaintiff can demonstrate the existence of clearly
established law not only by pointing out 'cases of controlling authority in their
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 833-34 (citing Wilson v. Layne 526 U.S. 603, 614 n.2 (1999)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Mitchell, supra note 30, at 962.
256. 62 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
257. See id. at 1299.
jurisdiction at the time of the incident,' but also through reference to 'a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority.'
258
Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson has created some
confusion among courts as to whether the Supreme Court intended to
promulgate a rule requiring courts considering a defense of qualified immunity
to decide first whether a constitutional right has been asserted and then to
decide whether a violation of that right occurred. 9 For example, in McCall v.
Williams,2" the District Court for the District of South Carolina held that
Wilson clarified the previously ambiguous methodology for qualified immunity
analysis.26' In this case, the District Court required the trial court to first
consider whether the officer in question applied excessive force before making
a determination of whether or not he was entitled to qualified immunity, as per
the Wilson requirement.262
Conversely, in Home v. Coughlin,63 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that Wilson did not create a rigid rule requiring a preliminary
determination of the constitutional issue in all cases.2' Home read the
Supreme Court's rulings on the issue of qualified immunity to mean that "lower
courts must be mindful of facts and circumstances that often justify addressing
the merits of constitutional claims, even though qualified immunity would
supply a sufficient ground for decision. "265 The Home court felt that the major
issue for consideration in such cases was whether or not the constitutional
question before the court would escape review by a federal court for a long
period of time, in which case it would be important to decide the issue first.2"
258. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615-17 (1999)).
259. See generally Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,609(1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabert, 526 U.S. 286
(1999). The reasoning set forth by Wilson for upholding this requirement was drawn from previous cases.
See id. Notwithstanding these facts, some lower courts still hold that Wilson established the rule and
removed prior ambiguity in this area.
260. 59 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.S.C. 1999).
261. See id. at 559. Also, the Florida District Court in Geidel v. City of Bradenton Beach also cited
Wilson in requiring a prior determination of the issue of constitutionality before considering the issue of
qualified immunity. Geidel v. City of Bradenton Beach, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 1999)
(quoting Wison v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)).
262. See McCall, 59 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 (D.S.C. 1999).
263. 191 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S .Ct. 594 (1999).
264. Id. at 248-49.
265. Id. at 249.
266. Id. In making this determination, the court relied on the holding in Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998), where a footnote to the opinion described deciding the constitutional issue first "as '[niormally'
the 'better approach.' Id. at 245 (quoting Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5). The court interpreted this to
mean that the constitutional issue must only be decided first when necessary to ensure that certain conduct
by officers will not indefinitely escape review. Id. at 246. Additionally, the court in Home sought to heed
the Supreme Court's traditional warning against the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional matters. Id.
(citing Ashwater v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Burton
v. United States, 196 U.S. 283,295 (1905); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration,
113 U.S.33,39(1885)). The Horne court viewed the statements of the Supreme Courtin Wilson regarding
qualified immunity as dictum rather than as establishing or clarifying rules. See id. at248 (citing Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999)).
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Thus, the Court in Wilson created some ambiguity and confusion with
regard to the preliminary determination of constitutional issues in qualified
immunity analysis.2 67 If this issue becomes a persistent source of conflicting
decisions, it may require the attention of the Supreme Court in the future.
3. Media Liability
Finally, the Court's decision in Wilson has some implications for the media
regarding liability for intrusion into private homes. First, the media cannot be
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983268 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,269 as the officers in Wilson were, because these
causes of action require an action by a government actor, and members of the
media are not government actors by definition.27
The likely result is that, if media members enter a private home without
the permission of the residents, they "might be liable under the torts of trespass
or invasion of privacy. '27' In order to state a claim for trespass, there must be
an intentional entry upon privately owned property.272 A trespass claim can be
defeated by either express or implied consent.273 In defense to claims of
trespass, the media often asserts that the First Amendment protects legitimate
newsgathering.274 However, courts usually reject this theory on the proposition
that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability
to gather and report the news.""'2 5 In addition, there are other restrictions on
267. See supra notes 259-266 and accompanying text.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
269. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing recovery for federal narcotics agents' Fourth Amendment
violations).
270. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
271. Levy, supra note 63, at 1192-93 (citations omitted).
272. Klindera, supra note 213, at 416 (citing RESTAIEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 158 (1965)).
273. Levy, supra note 63, at 1193 (citing Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914,917 (Fla. 1976);
see also Klindera, supra note 213, at 416. In Fletcher, the court held that no trepass occurred when a
newspaper photographer entered a home destroyed by fire to photograph the scene, because custom and
usage provided the newspaper with implied consent. Klindera, supra note 213, at 417-18. Most courts
distinguish Fletcher on the basis of its unique factual circumstances, and are reluctant to find implied
consent. Id. at 418.
274. Klindera, supra note 213, at 416-417.
275. Id. at 417 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); citing Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977); Brenzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708-09
(1972); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
130-33 (1937)).
the right to recover under tort theories.276 Some recoveries under tort require a
showing of actual malice, which can be a difficult test for a plaintiff to meet.277
Even if a private party is able to establish all of the elements necessary for
a valid tort claim, the media may still protect itself from liability through the
use of consent.278 If the media obtains consent from the persons that they film
or photograph, it will be a complete defense to any tort claims.279 Presumably,
media members act at their own risk if consent is denied but they proceed to
film or photograph.28 °
B. Legislative Impact
Media intrusiveness has become an increasingly prevalent issue in
constitutional litigation.28' Following Princess Diana's death, Congress and a
number of states introduced bills aimed at restraining paparazzi.282 These
proposals, however, are likely to affect all members of the media.283  The
Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Layne2' has the potential to spur a
similar watershed of legislative proposals to protect private persons from
unnecessary intrusion by either the media or law enforcement.
For example, the recent interest in privacy protection was a catalyst for the
Personal Privacy Protection Act285 legislation, designed to "create additional
civil and criminal violations for newsgathering activities like filming and
photographing for a commercial purpose when it constitutes an unwarranted
harassment or a violation of privacy. "286 Also, in California, anti-paparazzi
bills have been introduced specifically to restrict the activities of celebrity
photographers.287 Additionally, Utah is considering the Personal Privacy
276. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1193.
277. Id.
278. Klindera, supra note 213, at 430.
279. Id.
280. Id. The author notes that, if consent is withheld, the media still has the option of"conceal[ing] the
person's identity or redact[ing] the footage to leak out identifying details." Id.
281. Dennis F. Hernandez, Current Developments in Privacy Litigation, 523 PL! / PAT. 263, 267
(1998).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
285. S. 3224, 105th Congr. (1998).
286. See Hernandez, supra note 281, at 293.
287. See id. Senator Burton (D-San Francisco) proposed SB 262 to provide a cause of action for the
tort of invasion of privacy where a plaintiff can prove that,a person capturing his or her impression (1) has
persistently physically followed or chased the plaintiff in a manner to cause the plaintiff to have a reasonable
fear of bodily injury in order to capture a visual image, sound recording or other physical impression of the
plaintiff, (2) has committed an act of trespass in order to capture a visual image, sound recording or other
physical impression of the plaintiff, or (3) if the defendant attempted to capture any type of image or sound
recording if the image or recording could not have been captured without a trespass unless a visual or
auditory device was used and the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 293-94.
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Information Amendments which would serve to limit the use of private
information about individuals.2 8
C. Social Impact
The Court's decision will have a social impact on law enforcement, the
media, and private individuals. First, law enforcement officials will now have
to take obvious precautions to guard themselves from liability. Any time the
police allow the media to accompany them into private homes, it is "trouble
with the law. 28 9 Law enforcement officers will have to take care not to allow
members of the media to accompany them into private homes without the
consent of homeowners.2' For example, the government might be wise to
adopt a policy requiring the media to get consent from private persons before
broadcasting or printing any information as a condition to allowing the media
to accompany officers and observe law enforcement activities.29'
On a positive note, some critics of media participation feel that law
enforcement officers will perform their duties more efficiently absent the
presence of the media.292 Law enforcement officers will no longer feel
compelled to "baby-sit" the media personnel or perform for the camera. 293 Law
enforcement officers will now be motivated more by the public interest, and less
by publicity.2" It is important to note that ride-alongs can still serve a valid
function if they are limited to recording events that occur in public places, as
this is a legitimate way to promote public knowledge and awareness of law
enforcement activities.295
With regard to the media, they, too, will need to take precautions to guard
against liability. Although consent or newsworthiness can be defenses to tort
claims, media members should take note that such arguments are "largely
ineffective." '296 Additionally, the Court's decision severely limits the media's
288. Id. at 294. The proposed amendments would impose criminal liability on one who reports "an
individual's name, age, address, race, criminal history, educational or employment history, financial
transactions," or personal opinions or views unless the individual consents in writing. Id. at 294-95.
289. Elsa Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals" - The Police/Media
Home Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. J. 325, 357 (1996).
290. See id. Additionally, the practice should be avoided as it has the potential to tarnish the reputation
of both the police and the media. Id. at 358.
291. See Klindera, supra note 213, at 430.
292. See Henry H. Rossbacher et al., An Invasion of Privacy: The Media's Involvement in Law
Enforcement Activities, 19 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. J. 313, 334 (1999).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Bond, supra note 2, at 870-71.
296. See Ransom, supra note 289, at 357-58.
ability to provide members of the public with information regarding law
enforcement activities.297 An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of twenty-four
news organizations with regard to the Wilson case argued that the press has an
important role in monitoring abuse of government power "'by observing and
recording first hand the activities of government officials charged with
enforcing the law."'298 The Court has consistently noted the value of the media
as a method for informing the public about government power and government
affairs,2 and the decision in Wilson v. Layne3"° will certainly limit media's
ability to perform this function 301
Finally, with regard to private persons, the Court's decision in Wilson
serves to protect valuable individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Media ride-alongs often catch private persons off guard, "in various stages of
undress, sometimes cowering in corners or closets, and invariably shielding
their faces from the glare of the camera lights ... "302 The Fourth Amendment
requires that individuals' right to privacy be completely protected, within the
bounds of public safety and crime control.3"3  Media ride-alongs are
unreasonable as they do not foster the utmost protection of individuals' Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, and further, during ride-alongs, law enforcement
officials are fostering unlawful conduct by the media."° Clearly, the Court's
decision in Wilson will serve to better protect these vital constitutional rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Wilson v. Layne, the Supreme Court set a defining precedent, that law
enforcement officials are liable when they allow media members to accompany
them into private homes when executing warrants.3 5 Although the Court
softened the blow by allowing qualified immunity in Wilson, courts will not be
so lenient in the future. Law in this area is now without a doubt clearly
established for future qualified immunity analysis. Police officers and media
members alike will be required to reconsider current policies allowing for "ride-
alongs," and both groups will now strive to protect themselves against liability.
297. See Klindera, supra note 213, at 403.
298. See Rebecca Porter, Media 'Ride-Alongs" Violate the Constitution, Supreme CourtRules, TRLAL
July 1999, at 120 (1999). Note that "the effectiveness of the media in scrutinizing the conduct of law
enforcement personnel may be greatly compromised given the potentially collusive and non-spontaneous
nature of the joint enterprise. See Ransom, supra note 289, at 356.
299. See Klindera, supra note 213, at 430 n.40 (citing Supreme Court decisions supporting this
proposition).
300. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
301. Note that the press does not have a First Amendment right to accompany public officials. Klindera,
supra note 213, at 403 n.40.
302. Ransom, supra note 289, at 355.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
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The Court left several issues undetermined. For example, the Court did
not consider whether the exclusionary rule will apply to any evidence that is
obtained by the media in violation of the Fourth Amendment.' Also, the
Court did not consider the extent to which the media and law enforcement must
be joint actors in order to hold the law enforcement officials liable for the
media's presence.3° These issues may require future attention, or perhaps they
will be left up to the interpretation of the lower courts.
Although Wilson left several issues unresolved, it did take a large and
definite step towards protecting the individual's Fourth Amendment right to
privacy and freedom from unnecessary intrusion. Individuals are no longer left
without a remedy when law enforcement officials violate their constitutional
rights by bringing media members into private homes.
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306. See id. at 614 n.2.
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